

Secret

No Foreign Dissem



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

USSR Celebrates Golden Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution

Secret

No 45

¹
20 October 1967

No. 0313/67A

MORI/CDF

SECRET

SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

WARNING

The **SPECIAL REPORT** contains classified information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

THE SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.



SECRET

SECRET

USSR CELEBRATES GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY OF BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Within the next few days the Soviet Union will begin with considerable pageantry a series of ceremonial observances marking its fifty years of Communist rule. Plans call for jubilee ceremonies in Leningrad, Moscow, and the capitals of the other 14 republics. The scenario in Moscow will resemble the annual October Revolution anniversary ritual, one Soviet official said, "only grander." The Communist states, China and Albania excepted, will be represented by top party officials. Attendance from the non-Communist world will probably be limited to private organizations and individuals and members of the Moscow diplomatic community. The Soviet leaders will be hard pressed to come up with new variations on standard themes for the golden anniversary. They will undoubtedly cite the achievements of the last five decades and particularly those of their own three-year tenure to "prove" that Russia's present position as a major world power is a consequence of Communist Party rule.

Attention On Internal Affairs

The speech making and attendant propaganda beginning next week are likely to stress domestic affairs focusing on recent measures to improve the lot of the Soviet citizen. The slogans for the October revolution observance this year dwell on domestic issues, citing largely historic attainments and national goals. In a reversal of the usual form, foreign items were put at the end of the litany.

Plaudits will also be given to Soviet military might and space accomplishments. The recent parachuting of a capsule through the atmosphere of Venus provides a timely and exploit-

able example of Moscow's accomplishments in space, and attempts at still further space spectacles appear likely before the celebrations begin.

Apart from the expected propaganda formulations, the Soviet leadership has in fact moved to improve the lot of the consumer. Per capita real income grew by about six percent each of the past two years, according to Soviet announcements, about twice the rate of the previous five years. Wage and welfare reforms were pledged at last month's Central Committee Plenum. For the anniversary, the USSR has ordered large quantities of consumer goods from Western Europe and Japan to supplement its own production. Moscow is also buying from Western

SECRET

SECRET



Cover of Soviet humor magazine Krokodil, 22 August 1967

SECRET

SECRET

suppliers more machinery and equipment for producing consumer goods, and presumably Soviet consumers can look forward to a continuing supply of better quality goods. Spurred by generous bonuses, Soviet light industries grew at almost double the planned rate the first half of the year, with the largest growth in the clothing industry.

Improvements in life in the Soviet Union have been spotty, however, and by all accounts the Soviet citizen is approaching the anniversary celebration with cynicism. Some amnesties may be granted in connection with the anniversary, but for Soviet intellectuals the fiftieth year has been bleak. They and others who seek greater political freedom may find some encouragement in long-range trends, but the regime-sponsored emphasis on national unity and singleness of purpose has made this year a step backward from freedom and one just as soon forgotten. Even a new constitution for the USSR which General Secretary Brezhnev promised would be ready for the fiftieth anniversary appears to have been set aside as too controversial an issue.

On foreign policy matters the Soviet leaders can be expected to confine themselves to the staple condemnation of "imperialism," and to perfunctory appeals for Communist unity. In painting the propaganda picture of increasing successes for "progressive" movements abroad, however, Moscow may find it necessary to use a broad historical

brush; recent events seem almost to be conspiring against the USSR's leaders in this anniversary year.

Attempts to turn up recent Soviet triumphs abroad in fact would be embarrassingly futile. Moscow is worried by the gradual emergence of a huge, implacably hostile, nuclear-armed China. It is anxious to forestall further escalation of the war in Vietnam, it is acutely embarrassed by the Arab debacle, it has been berated for cowardice by such expensive clients as Fidel Castro and Algeria's Boumediene, and it has been sniped at by the opportunistic members of its own ideological world. The golden anniversary year has also seen cosmonaut Komarov's fatal accident, the Svetlana affair, and a string of rather serious intelligence failures.

Prospective Attendance

Recent setbacks and frustrations, however, will not prevent Moscow from attempting to use the presence of Communist and other "progressive" leaders at the anniversary festivities to demonstrate that Soviet policies enjoy wide international support. With the exception of Albania and China, for obvious reasons, top leaders from all ruling Communist parties and virtually all other Communist parties can be expected to gather in Moscow next week. Even those parties which have demonstrated a considerable independence of Moscow reportedly plan to send major delegations. Ceausescu is expected to lead the Rumanian

SECRET

SECRET

delegation and Tito will lead the Yugoslav delegation. North Vietnam and Cuba will probably be represented by high party officials. The French and Italian parties plan to send their top people.

With all of these Communist leaders in Moscow, there will be many opportunities for informal talks among themselves and with the Soviet hierarchy. There will almost certainly be no attempt, however, to convene a formal all-party conference on the order of the meetings of 1957 or 1960 with a fixed agenda and joint declarations. The Soviet leaders seem to have reconciled themselves to the fact that coordinated world Communism cannot be achieved. There seems little inclination in Moscow, therefore, to endanger the atmosphere of unity at the celebrations by pressing in earnest for a formal meeting.

In addition to the foreign Communist parties, other leftist parties, front groups, and trade unions will be represented. Nationals from as many as 100 countries may attend.

Pageantry Arrangements

The Soviet leaders have said little in public about the specific events planned for the ceremonies. The formal anniversary festivities probably will

begin on 3 November with a joint two-day session of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Delegations from "fraternal" parties and other guests coming to Moscow reportedly will be invited to take part.

On 5 November, Leningrad reportedly will host a "festive" meeting arranged by the Leningrad Oblast party committee and the city Soviet, with Moscow party and city Soviet representatives joining in. Meetings and demonstrations will also be held in capitals of various union republics. Party chief Brezhnev will almost certainly make a major speech.

Red Square on the morning of 7 November will be the setting for the military parade and workers' demonstrations. Later in the day the Soviet leaders will hold a mammoth reception in the Kremlin. According to an official of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, one or two offensive ballistic missiles and possibly one or two rockets connected with ballistic missile defense will be shown for the first time. The SS-7--a liquid-fueled missile which was shown on Moscow television in 1965 and which was the backbone of the Soviet ICBM force until 1966--may be paraded. Another missile that might be displayed is the SS-12, a new weapon intended for support

SECRET

SECRET

of Soviet ground forces. The Soviets may also show what they claim to be a new ABM as well as the Galosh and Griffin missiles they have paraded in the past.

The Soviet leaders can be expected to try various propaganda ploys to ensure daily headline treatment in the world press. They may, for example, by a new

twist of phrase or some special assist from Hanoi, attempt to provide some attention-catching example of Moscow's support for the defense of North Vietnam.

No great surprises of a policy or personnel nature are anticipated in connection with the anniversary observance. (SECRET)

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Secret

Secret